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s.  2/73  3 Explanatory  Memorandum 
1.  At their Conference from 19 to 21  Octo-
ber 1972 the Heads of State or of Government 
of  the nine Member States  accompanied  their 
programme for  strengthening  the  Community 
with precise declarations concerning the latter's 
responsibilities and tasks in the field of external 
relations.  Thus, in paragraph 5 of the Preamble 
to  the .. Paris  Communique  the  Community's 
resolve  to  promote the development  of inter-
national  trade  is  reaffirmed:  "This  resolve  is 
extended  to  all  countries  without  exception. 
The Community is  prepared, openmindedly as 
it has already proved and in line with the IMF 
and  GATT  procedures,  to  enter  as  soon  as 
possible into negotiations based on the principle 
of  reciprocity,  which  will  allow  stable  and 
balanced  economic relations to be  achieved  in 
monetary  affairs  and  trade  and  where  the 
interests of the developing countries must receive 
full consideration." 
2.  In this  connection, it should be pointed 
out that the establishment of the EEC, far from 
constituting a handicap to the development of 
international trade, has, on the contrary, caused 
a vast expansion of trade both within western 
Europe and with other parts of the world.  Its 
existence has, moreover, made it easier to obtain, 
and  perhaps  even  ensured,  a  successful  con-
clusion  to  the  far-reaching  multilateral  trade 
negotiations within the framework of the GATT. 
The GATT system, which had freed  the post-
war  world  from  the  arbitrariness  of  purely 
national trading policies,  had become blockecl 
by the  limitations  inherent in the fact  that  c.. 
great  many  small  and medium  sized  partners 
were confronted by a much stronger one.  The 
principle that all  were equal-expressed in the 
most  favoured  nation  rule-contrasted  too 
sharply  with the  actual inequality in terms  of 
importance and therefore, of commercial poten-
tial.  Hence the movement towards free  trade 
areas and customs unions. 
Following  the establishment  of  the  EEC,  the 
industrialized nations-and amongst them par-
ticularly Europe and the United States-agreed 
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to  mutual reductions  in trade  barriers, within 
still modest limits in the Dillon Round, but on 
an unprecedented scale  after the United States 
Congress  passed  the  Trade  Expansion  Act 
(Kennedy  Round).  The Community  emerged 
from these negotiations with the lowest customs 
tariff  of  any  of  the  major  trading  powers, 
amounting to hardly more than half the average 
of the original tariffs of its Member States. 
This vast movement of liberalization and almost 
uninterrupted  economic  expansion  within the 
Community have  made  possible  a  remarkable 
expansion  of  its  international  trade.  This  in 
turn has provided the basis for a high and stable 
level of employment and the rise in the standard 
of living of recent years. 
3.  For the enlarged Community, as for the 
"Six", international trade constitutes an essential 
and increasingly important element of economic 
development.  What is at issue therefore is that 
the policy of  trade liberalization to which the 
original  Community  contributed  so  much 
should be  confirmed and further pursued.  In 
this  context  the  Community  is  aware  that it 
accepts certain responsibilities of its own at the 
international level,  both towards  other indus-
trialized countries and towards the developing 
countries.  It  expects  its  partners to approach 
the negotiations in the same spirit and with the 
same concern to establish stable and balanced 
economic relations. 
This note deals only with the trade negotiations, 
on  the  assumption  that  adequate  machinery 
will be developed in the monetary field to ensure 
for the long term the balance and stability that 
are  essential.  It  should  be  emphasized  that 
international measures in the field  of trade on 
the  scale  contemplated  would  be  placed  in 
serious  jeopardy  unless  means  were  found to 
protect  the  world  economy  from  monetary 
upheavels and imbalances such as  those which 
have occurred recently. 
If the defects  of the  monetary  system  cannot 
be  put  right  by  measures  in  the  commercial 
field,  neither  can  a  policy  of  world  trade 
5 liberalization  be  successfully  pursued  unless 
joint  efforts  are  made to set  up an adequate 
monetary system. 
4.  Even before enlargement, the Community 
had  expressed  the  political  will  to  undertake 
wide-ranging trade negotiations with its partners. 
In  December  1971  the  Council  declared  that 
"the Community is ready  ... to take part in global 
negotiations on the basis  of mutual advantage 
and reciprocity  and  requiring  an  effort  from 
all the participants".  This  was  confirmed by 
the  "Joint  Declaration"  accompanying  the 
limited  agreement  with  the  United  States  in 
1972,  which affirmed the necessity to "initiate 
and  actively  support  multilateral  and  com-
prehensive  negotiations  in  the  framework  of 
GATT"  ... ,  "conducted on the basis  of  mutual 
advantage and mutual commitment with overall 
reciprocity". 
In October 1972 the Summit Conference invited 
the Community institutions to define a "global 
approach" to these negotiations by 1 July 1973, 
and  expressed  the  hope  that  they  could  be 
concluded  before  the end  of  1975.  Hence,  it 
is essential for all partners to make the necessary 
preparations  so  that  they  can  actually  begin 
negotiations  immediately  after  the  summer  of 
this year. 
The following  chapters deal with the fields  to 
be  covered  in  the  negotiations,  and  with  the 
broad lines to be  followed in order to achieve 
results satisfactory to all partners. 
The Community, faithful to the guidelines laid 
down for its own development and to its own 
special  responsibilities,  will  take part in  these 
negotiations  on the  basis  that those  elements 
basic to its unity, i.e. the customs union and its 
common  policies,  in  particular  the  common 
agricultural policy, cannot be called in question. 
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Chapter I 
General  objectives  of the  negotiations 
A  Council  Resolution  of  13  December  1971 
stated: 
"The changes in economic relations necessitate 
an overall examination of the world economic 
structure  and the  conditions  for  a  new  inter-
national  balance,  which  would  enable  the 
standard of living to be improved by expanding 
international economic relations and liberalising 
world trade to an ever wider extent." 
Starting from these general considerations, the 
Community's  objectives  in  these  negotiations 
are defined as follows: 
1.  to consolidate  and continue the liberaliza-
tion  of  international  trade  on  the  basis  of 
reciprocity and mutual advantage; 
2.  to  improve  the  opportunities for  the  de-
veloping countries to participate in the expansion 
of world trade and to ensure a better equilibrium 
between developed and developing countries as 
regards  the  opportunities  for  this  expansion. 
The  Community  will,  for  its  part,  contribute 
actively  to this  objective  without jeopardising 
the advantages enjoyed by those countries with 
which  the Community has  special  relations. 
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Industrial  customs  tariffs 
1.  As  far as  tariffs are concerned, the trade 
negotiations must lead to a significant lowering 
of customs tariffs. 
2.  The formula for lowering customs tariffs 
on  industrial  products  must  be  simple  and 
generally applicable. 
3.  While recognizing that mutual advantage 
and reciprocity  must be  sought in  the overall 
outcome of the whole range of the negotiation, 
the  aim  should be  to seek,  so far  as  possible, 
reciprocity  in  each  individual  field,  in  partic-
ular as far as tariffs are concerned. 
4.  It  has  been  suggested  that  the  total 
elimination  of  all  customs  tariffs  might  be 
taken as a working hypothesis for these negotia-
tions.  In  the  present  state  of  international 
economic relations this  does  not seem realistic 
for  two  main  reasons.  First  because  of  the 
extent  of  customs  duties  on  certain  products 
and in certain countries, which protect economic 
sectors  that are  already  experiencing  real  dif-
ficulties  in  standing  up  to  competition;  and 
secondly  because  of the  lack  of  international 
organization  and  harmonization  of  national 
policies  concerning,  for  instance,  taxation, 
social  legislation  and  measures  to  stimulate 
economic development. 
5.  The formula for lowering customs tariffs 
must  necessarily  take  into  account  the  con-
siderable  differences  which  exist  between  the 
tariffs  applied  by  the  developed  countries. 
Quite  apart from  the question  of  the  general 
level  of  tariffs,  there  are  also  structural  dif-
ferences.  Some  countries  apply  tariffs  of  a 
roughly  homogeneous  level  to  all  products 
while  others  apply  very  high  tariffs  to  some 
products and much lower ones to others.  The 
formula adopted should aim, within the overall 
objective of lowering tariffs, at levelling off the 
differences caused by these peaks and troughs. 
This  would  have  the  effect  of  creating  more 
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equitable conditions for  trade and diminishing 
the present inequalities in  the tariff protection 
of the various developed countries.  This is the 
only approach which would make it possible to 
avoid  a  situation  in  which,  following  further 
reductions  of  customs  tariffs,  some  would  be 
so  low  that  certain  countries  would  have 
little hope of subsequently obtaining reductions 
in  the  higher  customs  duties  which  others 
would still be maintaining. 
6.  The formula  for lowering  tariffs  should 
therefore be based on the principle of the higher 
the tariff the greater the reduction of  customs 
duty.  A  threshold  or  floor  should  be  set 
below which no reduction would be  required, 
which  would  prevent  those  countries  with 
highly  diversified customs tariffs  being obliged 
to lower them to such an extent that it would 
be difficult to achieve reciprocity. 
7.  The  formula  should  take  into  account 
that  the  real  level  of  protection  has  to  be 
calculated  on  the  basis  of  the  value  added. 
8.  This general approach should in no way 
exclude  the  possibility  of  seeking,  during  the 
negotiations,  on  a  basis  of  reciprocity,  con-
cessions  going  beyond  the  general  rule  and 
aimed at eliminating customs duties on certain 
products.  The  possibility  of  negotiating,  in 
certain sectors, on a basis covering both tariffs 
and non-tariff barriers with the aim of achieving 
a  balanced result should also be  envisaged. 
9.  The further  lowering  of  customs  tariffs 
inevitably involves a reduction in the preference 
margin from which developing countries benefit 
in  those  developed  countries  which  have 
introduced the Generalised Preference Scheme. 
In  anticipation  of  the  implementation  of  the 
generalised Preference Scheme by all developed 
countries, the Community should take steps to 
improve  its  own  scheme  in  accordance  with 
the directives given by the conference  of Heads 
of  State  or  of  Government in  October 1972. 
(See  Chapter V on developing countries.) 
7 Chapter Ill 
Non-tariff barriers 
1.  The diversity of non-tariff barriers makes 
it  unrealistic  to  seek  a  solution  of  a  general 
character;  there  must  therefore  be  a  case  by 
case  approach while still  bearing in mind that 
in some cases there is an interdependence. 
2.  The existence of  so  many types  of non-
tariff  barriers  (classified  by  GATT  under 
nearly thirty chapter headings each subdivided 
into a number of more or less similar individual 
measures  applied by different countries)  seems 
to preclude finding solutions for all the measur~s 
listed.  It  is  therefore  desirable  that  certam 
types of measures be selected o~ which nego~ia­
tion  would  take  place  but  without  excludmg 
the possibility that other barriers may be .a~ded 
to  the  list  in  the  course  of  the  negotiatiOns 
should this prove necessary. 
3.  Work has  already begun, or will shortly 
begin,  in  GATT  or  the  OECD,  on  subjects 
chosen by mutual agreement which will almost 
certainly be the object of negotiations.  These 
consist  of  quantitative  restrictions  (including 
voluntary limitation of exports), customs valua-
tion, licensing systems, technical standards and 
regulations,  labelling  and  packing,  export 
subsidies  and  other  aids  affecting  commerce, 
countervailing duties, and government procure-
ment. 
4.  Reciprocity is  harder to assess  o.ver  non-
tariff  barriers  than  over  customs  duties,  so  a 
broad  spread  of  solutions  will  be  needed  to 
make  up  a  worthwhile  and  well-balanced 
package. 
5.  Many similar measures are applied by  a 
large number of  countries  and  therefore  lend 
themselves to multilateral solutions, whether by 
abolition  or amendment  or by  agreement  on 
greater harmony or discipline.  These solutions 
may  involve  constraints  of  varying  degrees, 
and  may  take  the  form  in  some  cases  of 
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interpretative  notes  to  the  existmg  provisions 
of  the  General  Agreement,  and  in  others  of 
general  principles  or  codes  of  behaviour. 
Although  it is  clearly  desirable  to  aim  at the 
maximum  degree  of  balance  between  com-
mitments in each subject negotiated, it should 
be  recognised  that  in  certain  subjects  there 
are from the outset some  built-in  imbalances. 
6.  For certain  measures  which  are applied 
by  only  one  or  two  countries,  the  solution 
may take the form of a  single limited decision 
(abolition  or adaptation), without there  being 
any need to lay down general rules. 
7.  The Community will have to specify the 
non-tariff barriers of its trading partner which it 
wishes  to  see  dealt  with  in  the  negotiations. 
It  will  no  doubt  be  desirable  to  supplement 
the list of subjects referred to in  paragraph 3 
with  a  limited  number  of  other  measures. 
For their part, the Community and its Member 
States  must  also  declare  their  readiness  to 
negotiate on some of the measures  they them-
selves  apply,  in  seeking  a  multilateral  or 
restricted  solution.  Since,  in  the  nature  of 
things,  it  is  essentially  the  Member  States' 
measures that are at issue here, they must agree 
in  the  near  future  on  a  sufficient  number 
of  negotiable  measures  to  enable  adequate 
reciprocity  to  be  offered  in  ret~un for  wh.at 
the  Community  will  be  seekmg  from  Its 
partners. 
8.  The  solutions  arrived  at  should  be 
accepted  by  as  many  countries  as  possib~e if 
the  existing  imbalance  between  the  vanous 
contracting  parties  is  not  to  be  worsened. 
It  should  therefore  be  made  clear  that  any 
advantages which  might derive from solutions 
comprising obligations going beyond the pres~nt 
GATT  rules  would  be  reserved  for  countnes 
which  in  practice  abide  by  these  solutions 
(conditional  application  of the  most-favoured-
nation clause). 
9.  With this same need for balance in mind, 
all  the  contracting  parties  should  cease  to 
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Protocol of Provisional Application. 
10.  The  agreement  reached  on  non-tariff 
barriers  should include  appropriate  machinery 
for consultation and the settlement of disputes. 
This machinery would both deal with differen-
ces  in interpretation of the agreement and with 
any  outstanding  difficulties  not dealt  with  in 
the negotiations or with any non-tariff barriers 
which  may  appear  after  conclusion  of  the 
negotiations. 
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Chapter IV 
Agriculture 
1.  The  principles  of  the  Common  Agri-
cultural  Policy  should  not  be  called  into 
question in dealing with this sector. 
The  objectives  of  the  negotiations  in  the 
agricultural sector should be  in  harmony with 
the  general  objectives  of  the  negotiations  but 
should also take into account the fundamental 
and  specific  characteristics  of  agriculture. 
2.  Two  characteristics  of  the  agricultural 
sector  are  the  universal  existence  of  support 
policies-of  which  the  internal  and  external 
aspects  are  unavoidably  linked-and  the  in-
stability of world markets  .The specific  objec-
tive  of  the  agricultural  negotiations  should 
therefore be "the expansion of trade in  stable 
world  markets".  Such  an  objective  can  only 
be  achieved  by  means  of  a  joint effort  by  all 
the principal partners in the negotiations, within 
the framework of their own agricultural policies. 
3.  As  the structural situation is  at the root 
of  many  agricultural  problems,  it  is  in  the 
interest  of  all  negotiating  parties,  in  order to 
attain  this  objective,  to  intensify  structural 
reforms  so  that  marketing  policies  and  price 
policies are based to a greater extent on economic 
considerations.  A declaration of intent in this 
field  might  be  worked out, without of course 
infringing  each  party's  right  to  take  its  own 
decisions. 
4.  The  conditions  for  expanding  trade 
would  be  more  favourable  if the  stability  of 
world  markets  was  better  assured.  The best 
means  of  obtaining  this  objective  would  be 
the  adoption  of  a  code  of  good  conduct 
covering  export  practices.  Such  an  arrange-
ment would presuppose an analogous effort by 
all  major  parties  to the  negotiations.  For  a 
number  of  specified  products,  complementary 
commitments could be entered into within the 
framework of international arrangements. 
9 5.  The  code  of  good  conduct  on  export 
practices  should  aim  at  introducing  market 
disciplines  with  concerted  action  on  the  use 
and scope of the rules agreed. 
6.  For  products  such  as  cereals  (wheat, 
flour  and  feed  grains),  rice,  sugar  and  the 
most  homogeneous  milk  products  {e.g.  milk 
powder  and  butter)  the  Community  will 
propose the negotiation of a  price mechanism 
(including  minimum  and  maximum  prices) 
accompanied  by  measures  covering  an  adjust-
ment of supply, including measures  of  storage 
which  would,  among  other  things,  facilitate 
the  application  of  food  aid  programmes. 
The Community considers that the best method 
of  applying  such  engagements  would  be  by 
the negotiation  of  international  arrangements. 
7.  This  reordering  of  world  markets,  es-
pecially  with  adequate  assurances  as  regards 
stability,  would  make  it  possible  to  adjust 
certain elements  of the import systems  within 
a general framework in which overall reciprocity 
is  achieved. 
8.  The aim of all these measures  would be 
to  promote  the  regular  expansion  of  trade, 
within the framework of each negotiating party's 
own  agricultural  policies.  The  Community, 
for its  part, while  honouring the principles  of 
the CAP,  would apply the instruments of this 
policy  in  such  a  way  as  to  ensure  that  the 
commitments thus  undertaken were respected. 
9.  The problems caused by the harmoniza-
tion  of  legislation  covering  both  human  and 
plant  health  and  of  the  various  rules  on  the 
use  and treatment of products should also  be 
covered in the negotiations. 
10.  Although  the  measures  set  out  above 
are aimed  at improving world markets which 
will  also  benefit  developing  countries,  the 
developed countries should also take additional 
action on those products of  particular interest 
to the developing  countries.  This would for 
example take the form of measures  of a  pre-
ferential  character,  which  would  give  these 




The  developing  countries 
1.  The developed countries have agreed to 
take particular account in these negotiations of 
the interests  of  developing countries.  That is 
to say,  the  developed  countries  will  not only 
try to ensure that the developing countries do 
not suffer indirect disadvantages, but will also 
help  to  expand  the  developing  countries' 
trade and improve their export revenue.  This 
was  emphasised  in  the  declaration  of  intent 
made by the Community on 13 December 1971; 
in  the Joint Declaration  by  the  United  States 
and the  Community in 1972;  and again in  the 
communique of the Summit Meeting in October 
1972,  which  also  states  that  the  task  will 
have  to  be  accomplished  without  detriment 
to the advantages enjoyed by  those developing 
countries  with  which  the  Community  has 
special relations.! 
The  Community's  objective  as  regards  the 
developing  countries  in  general  should  be  to 
achieve  a  coherent  body  of  measures  and  a 
balanced  contribution  by industrialized  coun-
tries.  There  are,  however,  great  differences 
between  the  levels  and  the  opportunities  of 
development in the various developing countries, 
so  the  Community  would  wish  to  reserve 
for  itself  the  possibility  of  varying  its  action 
to  meet  the  particular  needs  of  individual 
countries.  Such  variation  could  relate,  in 
particular,  to  the  nature  of  the  concessions 
made to different developing countries, to the 
choice  of  products,  and  to  a  degree  of  reci-
procity  which  might  be  required  of the  more 
advanced developing countries. 
2.  Tariffs 
(a)  In  the  field  of  generalized  preferences, 
the  Community  would  wish  to  improve  the 
1  Cf.  separate  Commission  Memorandum  on  the 
preparation  of  negotiations  with  these  countries: 
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two years now.  But these improvements must 
be  dependent  upon  other industrialized  coun-
tries,  and  in  particular  the  United  States, 
introducing a scheme comparable in its  effects 
with the Community scheme. 
Subject to this condition, the system of genera-
lised  preferences  could  be  improved  in  two 
ways: 
(i}  by including a  larger number of processed 
agricultural  products  in  the  list  of  products 
which benefit from preferences and by increasing 
the  margin  of  preference  for  those  already 
included; 
(ii)  by  raising  the  quantitative  ceilings  and 
making the detailed rules  of  application  more 
flexible.  · 
(b)  The  proposal  in  Chapter  II  that  there 
should  be  no  reduction  in  duties  below  a 
certain  level  would  mean  in  effect  that  a 
. margin  of  preference  for  developing  countries 
would  be  maintained in  these  special  cases. 
(c)  Finally, the Community reserves  the right 
to  propose  to  other  developed  countries  in 
the  course  of  the  negotiations  that  by  joint 
agreement  exceptions  to  the  general  formula 
of  tariff  reduction  might  be  introduced  for  a 
small  number of  products which  are included 
in the system of generalized preferences and in 
which  the  less  developed  countries· have  a 
particular interest. 
3.  Non-tariff barriers 
In the field of non-tariff barriers the developed 
countries  should  endeavour to  take particular 
account of the interests of developing countries 
both  in  adapting  rules  and  in  reducing  or 
abolishing certain quantitative restrictions which 
especially affect exports from developing coun-
tries.  In  return  the  developing  countries 
could make a  contribution which would be in 
their own interest by simplifying their admini-
strative system for imports. 
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4.  Agricultural products 
(a}  In  any  international  arrangements  to 
regulate  the  markets  for  certain  agricultural 
products, the interests of the developing coun-
tries should be taken into account, in particular 
through  efforts  to  lighten  the  burden  which 
some of  the provisions could involve for  these 
countries.  · 
(b)  Food aid commitments  can  be  envisaged 
in  the  context  of  regulation  of  the  markets. 
(c)  Moreover,  as  is  stated  in  Chapter  IV, 
"the  developed  countries  should  also  take 
additional action on those products of p-articular 
interest  to  the  developing  countries.  This 
would for example take the form of measures 
of  a  preferential  character,  which  would give 
these  countries  a  chance  to  increase  their 
export revenue." 
11 Chapter VI 
Safeguard  clause 
1.  The object of a safeguard clause must be 
to  enable  purely  transitory 'difficulties  t~  _he 
overcome  or to  give  the  branches  of  act1v1ty 
concerned the period of adaptation which they 
need in order to adjust themselves to the require-
ments of international competition. 
2.  The  current  provisions  of  Article  XIX 
of the General Agreement should be maintained 
as  they  are.  It must,  however,  be  recognized 
that this Article has proved difficult to operate 
effectively.  For this  reason  it  might  be  a~vi­
sable  to  supplement  it,  on  the  understandu~g 
that  the  countries  concerned  would  retam 
their  right  to  have  recourse  to  the  current 
provisions of Article XIX.  Such a supplement 
to Article XIX could provide for it to be  used 
in a selective fashion. 
3.  This new system would on the one hand 
involve  both greater  flexibility  in  the  type  of 
safeguard  measures  allowed,  and  a  limitation 
in  the  compensatory  or  retaliatory  rights  of 
the  third  countries  concerned.  On the  other 
hand any country having recourse to it would 
have  to  accept  increased  control  procedures 
and  requirements  relating  to  the  conversion 
or  adaptation  of  the  economic  sectors  con-
cerned. 
4.  These supplementary arrangements might 
be as follows: 
(a)  Type of measures and their scope: 
(i)  To  prevent  the  measures  from  having  a 
more  extensive  impact  than  is  necessary,  a 
selective  application  as  regards  the  form  of 
the  measure  would  have  to  be  authorised 
while maintaining non-discrimination as regards 
its  substance.  All  imports  which  contribute 
in  the same  way  to  disorganizing  the  market 
would be dealt with in the same  manner. 
(ii)  The  character  of  the  safeguard  measure 
could vary, on the understanding that imports 
would  not be  restricted  to  a  level  lower  than 
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that  reached  during  a  short  reference  period 
before the measure was applied. 
(b)  Duration of the measures: 
Recourse  to  them  should  be  temporary, 
and their mode of operation shall be degressive. 
It will be a necessary condition of the temporary 
nature of the measures that agreed adjustments 
take  place  during  the  period  of  recourse  to 
them. 
(c)  Rights of injured third countries: 
The right of injured countries to compensa-
tion or to  compensatory withdrawal would be 
suspended  provided  all  the  conditions  are 
fulfilled. 
(d)  Procedures: 
(i)  Taking into account the greater flexibility 
thus  provided  for  in  these  arrangements,  a 
permanent institutional supervisory mechanism 
consisting  of  independent personalities  should 
be  set  up to which possible disputes  could be 
referred. 
(ii)  It would be  necessary to make the emer-
gency procedure really exceptional.  Prior noti-
fication  should be  demanded in  all  cases. 
Any new procedure for applying such measures 
must  not  have  the  sole  effect  of  making  the 
mechanism more flexible but must at the same 
time  lay  down  the  precise  criteria  for  their 
application and must strengthen the means for 
supervising the use of such measures. 
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